“Eastern Europe, with Russian pressures, is still a tinderbox,” said Gen. (Ret.) Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1997-2000). If it blows up, “it will have global consequences—not only on the United States, but also on US interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.” 

In a Q&A with the Center for European Policy Analysis, Clark discussed the critical role of US forces in Europe for global security, the urgency of deterring Russian aggression, and the far-reaching risks of deprioritizing Europe in favor of a strategic pivot to Asia. 

CEPA: How would you assess the operational impact of losing access to air and naval hubs like Ramstein, Poznan, Lakenheath, or Rota, particularly in terms of the U.S. military’s ability to project power globally?

Clark: Europe is the launchpad, really, for American global influence in most of Eurasia, and it has to be understood in that context. And now there is a Russian threat to Europe, and so these American bases are critical in providing reassurance of US commitment, and especially the linkage to the US strategic nuclear deterrent in dealing with Russia. We’re approaching a critical point in this effort to deter further Russian aggression. Ukraine is holding, but only with strong US military assistance. That military assistance has been coordinated through our facilities in Europe. Our men and women there, both in uniform and civilians, have been critical in helping facilitate the delivery of arms, munitions and other equipment to Ukraine, but also in providing reassurance to our European allies.

CEPA: How do forward deployments on NATO’s eastern flank contribute to broader US security objectives? 

Clark: When Russia seized Crimea and invaded the Donbas in early 2014, NATO suddenly woke up and realized that the measures taken during the Cold War for reinforcement, movement of forces, and actual deterrence had all been forgotten and hadn’t been developed. Even though Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were NATO members at the time, there was no easy way to reinforce and support them should a Russian attack emerge. 

Concurrent with Russian military activities, buildups, and aggression in Ukraine, over the years, the United States and NATO allies in Europe have reinstituted many of the procedures, efforts, and planning that were discarded after the end of the Cold War. Now, we’re able to assign forces to positions in Eastern Europe, not permanent positions for the most part, but temporary and training ones, and we’re rotating forces in and out. These forces train with our allies. They get familiarity with the terrain. Of course, should something happen, they would be there. And the assumption by our allies and by the men and women in the forces themselves, is, if there’s trouble, they’ll fight. This is the context in which we deploy these forces. 

Thus far, they’ve not been called on to fight. We had a recent tragedy in Lithuania, where a heavy recovery vehicle was sunk, lost in a bog near the border with Belarus. But, other than that, there’s been no real issues here. 

35 years ago, we said that we wouldn’t ever think about stationing forces there. But then, about 30 years ago, Russia signed an agreement that it would always respect the integrity of the borders of Ukraine. As Russia has changed, the United States and NATO have had to respond. Having these forces in Europe, having reception stations in Germany, then being able to move them by train and by road and march into Eastern Europe, is really important. 

Now, we’re facing one of the most critical challenges, which is the protection of the Suwałki Gap. We’ve seen the buildup of Russian forces in Northwest Belarus, opposite Kaliningrad. It’s only logical for Russian military planners, of course, that the first thing they want to do is link up with the forces in Kaliningrad. That way, they drive a deep penetration into NATO. They block the use of the Baltic Sea. They threaten Finland, Sweden, and Denmark by that geography, and obviously, they then make it possible to cut off the Baltics and leave them vulnerable to aggression by other Russian forces. So it’s an obvious first key objective. We’ve got forces there in Lithuania. We rotate US forces and other allied forces in and out of Poland, Lithuania and other Baltic countries for the express reason of deterrence. And these forces are important and going to be increasingly important. 

The more discussion there is in the United States about the realignment of US defense policy, the more emphasis on China and less on Europe, the greater the risk grows in Europe. These forces are critical to have in place to deal with this risk successfully.

CEPA: How do you think Russia and China might interpret a significant US withdrawal or closure of key bases in Europe?

Clark: If the United States were to withdraw forces in Europe, particularly in the context of a cutback of US Army forces in scale, which has been discussed, it would be certainly welcomed, even applauded by Moscow and Beijing. They would see it as a US surrender, a US retreat, and an indication that the United States also won’t stand firm in Asia. 

Why? Because Russia is the near-term threat. Russia has already expressed its intentions to go beyond the current aggression in Ukraine. China is building up its military. Certainly, Xi Jinping has said he wants Taiwan, and he has previously experimented with his so-called wolf warrior diplomacy. 

But the truth is that US deterrence in Europe is the deterrence that underpins global stability and security. It’s the deterrence at the point of the challenge. It’s the deterrence and preparation for defense against the most immediate threat, and it’s the assurance to allies on whom the United States relies not only for its diplomatic support, but for foreign investment and even reinforcement should conflict break out in Asia. The US forces in Europe are irreplaceable. They should be augmented, and all talk of withdrawal should be stopped.

CEPA: What do you think is overlooked or misunderstood from the debate about US force posture in Europe?

Clark: I think it’s been convenient to focus on China as a worthy adversary, really starting in the 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Pentagon was looking for what are we supposed to do? How do we know if we’re doing the right thing with our procurement? People looked and said, ‘Oh, China, let’s watch China.’ And so we began to watch China. Then, as it became more aggressive, after it entered the World Trade Organization and grew, and after Xi Jinping came to power, President Obama pivoted toward Asia. He is the one who really turned us away from Europe. So, it’s been the Obama administration, it’s been the Trump administration, it’s been the Biden administration, and now it’s President Trump again. These are four US administrations that have essentially disregarded the platform of stability which has brought peace and security to the world for the last 80 years. It’s really a pity. 

During the Obama administration, we essentially outsourced our European policy to Angela Merkel, and of course, she was a popularly elected leader of Germany, but she didn’t have US interests at heart. A lot of people in the United States have misunderstood that Eastern Europe, with Russian pressures, is still a tinderbox. It could blow up, and if it blows up, it will have global consequences, not only on the United States, but also on US interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. So, it’s absolutely essential that we maintain our focus on Europe. 

I know it’s politically easier to focus on China. Why? Let’s call it like it is. There’s a certain degree of racism in this and there’s a certain degree of sort of Christian nationalism. It’s what Putin wants to say to Americans, ‘Hey, you know, we’re white, we’re Christian, we’re just like you. We’re against those Chinese.’ But it’s not true. They’re not just like us. We believe in individual freedom and liberty. Russia, under Putin, is a statist organization. Everything is run by the state. There is no individual freedom. There’s no liberty. And you can cite the National Rifle Association relationships. Yes, we believe in the Second Amendment in the United States. I promise you, Russia doesn’t. This idea of this parallelism between Russia and the United States is a figment of Russian information warfare that’s been sold to the United States over a period of 15 to 20 years. 

On the other hand, with China, we do actually have synergistic interests. We have manufacturing in China. They do resources with us. We can work with China if we don’t make an enemy of it. So it’s been convenient domestically, politically, to focus on Asia. It’s important economically to focus on Asia, but the right way to handle it is with diplomacy and economics, not by withdrawing military forces from Europe.

Interview conducted by Mila Tanhge of CEPA’s editorial staff.

Mila Tanghe attended Columbia University and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Military experts explain why US bases in Europe matter.

Learn More